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us out," apparently because they carried leaflets handed to
them by the protesters. A 35-year-old housewife and her
fourth-grade son were ejected when a marshal saw them
speaking to a long-haired youth through a window.
A Quaker Sunday school class of 12- and 13-year-olds
who'd come to see their Quaker President, the 16-year-old
daughter of a superior court judge and two grandchildren
of a former Charlotte mayor received the same treatment.
" Of co~rse they had on blue jeans," said the mother of the
latter two in an angry letter to the editor of the Charlotte
Observer. "Of course his hair is long. Isn't your son's?" By
the time it was all over, five youths had been arrested.
" It wasn't the Secret Service," said Deputy White House
Press Secretary Gerald Warren. " It must have been local
people." Local officials said, however, that the Secret
Service gave the orders.
Charlotte Chamber of Commerce President Charles
Crutchfield, the initiator of the Graham Day program, said
the decision to bar people from the Coliseum was based on

intelligence reports that "several hundred young people
who had long hair and [who would be] dressed like hippies . . . would take over the stage and disrupt the program." He added that "the Secret Service instructed the
police to examine very carefully all people with long hair
and beards." One of the demonstrators said later that
Crutchfield was crediting them with more organization
than they ever dreamed of.
Few people would deny that the Secret Service should
act when the President is directly threatened. But the
arbitrary actions in Charlotte show that it was more interested in preventing embarrassment than harm to Mr.
Nixon. Such actions are taking on a pattern. Similar ones
occurred when he appeared in Dayton in September.
Former Secrct Service agent Rufus Youngblood, who
protected Lyndon Johnson in Dallas when John Kennedy
was shot, says agents today have to be " Nixon men" to
get anywhere. Perhaps that explains a lot.
WILLIAM ARTHUR, JR. and POLLY PADDOCK
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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

/

SECRECY IN A FREE SOCIETY
SEN. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.
Senator Ervin (D., N.C.) is chairman of the Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Washington
I am alarmed, as are my colleagues in the Congress, by
the increasing frequency with which the executive branch
withholds from Congress information vital to its legislative functions. Congress' decision-making role cannot be
denied, but by the invocation of "executive privilege,"
the President, in effect, excludes the legislature from
meaningful participation in that process. This dangerously
expanding trend toward government by secrecy negates
the constitutional principle of "a9couptability" as envisioned by the founding fathers , and does violence to
the principle of separation of powers upon which our
system of government is based.
The term "executive privilege," as currently used, most
commonly refers to a situation in which the executive
branch refuses to divulge information requested by the
Congress. It is a term employed more often by members
of the legislative branch and by scholars than by the
members of the executive branch who willfully withhold
information. As I use the term, it refers to the executive
branch's denial of ant. !dn~ of information to any person,
be he a member of the Congress or 0 t e taxpaying public.
The recent controversies surrounding the publication
of the so-called "Pentagon Papers"; the court fight for
the release of the Garwin Report on the SST; Representative Mink's pending suit against the Environmental
Protection Agency, seeking release of the report on the
ABC's proposed nuclear test on Amchitka Island, and
the denial to Senator Fulbright of access to the five-year
foreign military assistance plans have brought the issue
sharply into focus in the public mind.
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At issue in any consideration of executive privilege
are three conflicting priIl tLples: (the alleged power of
the President to withhold information, the disclosure of
which he feels would impede the performance of his constitutional responsibilities ;~he power of the legislative
branch to obtain information in order to legislate wisely
and effectively~d the basic right of the taxpaying pub Ii
to know what its government is doing)
These opposing principles have clashed in almost every
administration since the legislative branch undertook an
investigation of the St. Clair Expedition during George
Washington's first term as President. Without questioning
the propriety of the investigation, President Washington
asserted:
First, that the House was an inquest, and therefore
might institute inquiries. Second, that it might call for
papers generally. Third, that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit
and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would
injure the public: consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the committee nor House
had a right to call on the Head of a Department, who
and whose papers were under the President alone; but
that the committee should instruct their chairman to
move the House to address the President. .
In spite of his contention that the executive possessed
the discretionary power-or duty-to refuse to communicate any information "the disclosure of which would injure the public," all of the St. Clair documents were
turned over to the Congress.
There is ample precedent for the view that Congress
has the power to institute inquiries and exact evidence.
"The power to legislate carries with it by implication
ample authority to obtain information needed in the rightful exercise of that power and to employ compulsory
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process for the purpose ...." McGrain v. Daugherty 273
U.S. 165 (1927).
Although the Constitution is silent with regard to the
existence of executive privilege, its exercise is now asserted
to be an inherent power of the President. Its constitutional
basis allegedly derives from the duty imposed upon the
President under Article II S.3 to see that the laws are
faithfully executed. The President claims the power on the
ground that he must have it in order to provide the executive branch with the autonomy needed to discharge its
duties properly. Inasmuch as "the Presid~nt alone ~d
unaided could not execute the laws . . . , but reqwres
"the assistance of subordinates"-Myers v. U .S. 272 U.S.
117 (1926 )-the alleged authority to exercise executive
privilege has been extended in practice to the entire
executive branch.
In theory, the release of information from the executive branch is governed in part by Executive Order No.
10501, issued by President Eisenhower, and amende.d by
him in Executive Order No. 10816, and by PreSident
Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10964. These orders
establish a system of security classifications for information on defense matters whose release might injure or
embarrass our national defense or our relations with
foreign nations.~uch order are not authorit to as
executive rivilege; t e s·
or i or restrict disclo ure
o classifi
rna en .
- President "Kennedy attempted to end the practice of
delegating to employees of the executive branch the authority to claim executive privilege. In a letter to. the
House Foreign Operations and Government .subcommittee
in 1962, he stated that the basic policy of his administration would be that "Executive rivile e can be i v ed
on!! by the President arid will not be used without s~cific
Pr£iidential approval." Presidents. Johnson and Nixon
reaffirmed this policy. Thus, theoretically, procedures
instituted in the executive branch would place with the
President the ultimate decision and responsibility for the
exercise of executive privilege. However, throughout my
years in the Senate, I have learned that there is a great
discrepancy between theory and practice, a discrepancy
,demonstrated, among other ways, by Congress' continuing
in'ability to obtain information from the executive branch.
The asserted doctrine of executive privilege has
developed unrestrained. In the absence of any Congressional statutory authority or constitutional grant of the
power, the will of each succeeding Presi<!eE!., has be~n
substituted for le 'slation in the fi . A contest of politica power between the Presi~ent and Congress. has
superseded the proper administration of federal functions
by the President under the restraints that would be provided by effective legislative oversight. Nor have the
courts given any definite guidance on the issue, although
the Reynolds 345 U.S. 1 (1953) and Curtiss-Wright 299
U.S. 304 (1936) cases do contain some dicta relating
to the problem.
The assertion of executive privilege, or the power to
withhold information, written and spoken, from Congress
and the public under the assumed "inherent executive power," must I think be viewed in the context of the slowly but
steadily increasing power of the executive-a development
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that has been duly noted by numerous political and legal
scholars. This increased power has enabled the executive
branch to make crucial decisions without answering to
any system of formal "accountability" for the exercise
of such powers beyond the Presidential election every four
years. Because the President has been able to act through
Executive Orders without the inconvenience and restraints
of Congressional authorization or delegation of power,
the principle of the separation' of governmental powers has
been seriously erode~.
In all candor, we in the legislative branch must confess
that the shifting of power to the executive branch has
resulted from our failure to assert our own constitutional
powers. Other than issue sporadic complaints, members
and committees of the Congress have done little to prevent the executive branch from withholding information
when, in its sole discretion, it determined that secrecy was
necessary-or politically desirable. Moreover, through
the almost unlimited delegation of authority to the
bureaucracy, Congress has actively e'iiCOUraged the aggrandizement of executive power. The executive branch has
access to information which the Congress cannot possibly
match, and it has asserted the discretionary authority to
employ that data in performing its myriad tasks. I fear
that the steady increase of executive power has come close
to creating a "government of men, not of laws."
The practice 'of executive privilege, it seems to me,
clearly contravenes the basic principle that the free flow
of ideas and information, and the open and full disclosure
of the governing process, are essential to the operation
of a free society. Throughout history, rulers have imposed secrecy on their actions in order to enslave the
citizenry in bonds of ignorance. By contrast, a government whose actions are completely visible to all of its
citizens best protects the freedoms embodied in the
Constitution.
Moreover, it is clear that the invocation of executive
privilege is contrary to the spir:it, if not the letter, of the
/ Freedom of Informatio~t (5 U.S.C. 552) , which
'cOngress pasSeo with the express purpose of expanding
to the fullest practical extent the full disclosure to the
public of the actions of the government. While it provides
for nwe sp!;Cific exceE!j.ons, it likewise specifies that none
of those exceptions constitutes authority to withhold information from the C~>Dgress. Section (4) (c) of the Act
explicitly states, "This section is not authority to withhold
information from Congress."
It also can be argued with some cogency that the
practice contravenes the philosophical thrust of the 1952
Supreme Court case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyers, 34? U.S. 579, where the Court invalidated
President Truman's seizure of the steel mills by Executive
Order. The several majority opinions in that case indicate that Congress is a co-equal branch of the government,
and that its prerogatives may not be usurped or impeded
by actions of the executive.
Beyond the penchant for maintaining secrecy
through the invocation of executive privilege, a mor
generalized attempt is made to withhold information
through the class~jon ..astern, the infirmities of which
were so clearlyreflected in the recent furor over the Penta45S

gon Papers, and in the general failure or refusal to disclose
data which are of potential interest to the public. When
the people do not know what their government is doing,
those who govern are not accountable for their actionsand accountability is basic to the democratic system. By
using devices of secrecy, the government attains the power
to ."~ana~e" the news ~d through it to m~nipulate public
oplDlon. uch power IS not consonant WIth a nation of
free men. Thus the exercise of the assumed power of
executive privilege is of basic importance to our governmental system, and the ramifications of a growing policy
of governmental secrecy is extremely dangerous to our
liberty.
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers, of which I am chairman, was mindful of these
dangers when it initiated its study on the subject, and
recently held hearings on executive privilege. It found
that the nation's history contains many examples of
Congressional demands for information that have been
countered with ~he invocation of executive privilege or
some other bureaucratic excuse for failing to reply. These
practices include delaying tactics which continue for so
long that the information, when submitted, is no longer
pertinent, and the placing of security classifications upon
information that is supplied, thereby preventing any
meaningful use of the data. Such practices reflect a certain contempt for Congressional requests for information
and an apparent disdain for the right of the American
?eople to be informed fully about the operations of their
government.
As chairman of another subcommittee-the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights-I have for
some time attempted to obtain ~ormation pertinent to
a ~tudy. of. Arm ~ce and data bank programs
which infnnge on the prIvacy and First Amendment
rights of citizens. While some ' of my requests for information ROd for the appearance of witnesses have been granted,

the most important have been denied for the following
stated reasons:
. . . we are precluded by consistent Executive branch
policy from releasing to the pUblic. (1. Fred Buzhardt,
General Counsel, Department oj Dejense)
Inappropriate to authorize the release of these documents. (Melvin LAird, Secretary oj Dejense)
This !nfo~mation is solely for your use in conducting
your mqUJry. (R. Kenly Webster, Acting General Counsel, Department oj Army)
The records . . . cannot be obtained without an inordinate expenditure of time and effort. (R. Kenly Webster, Acting General Counsel, Department oj Army)
No useful purpose would be served by a public report
on the materials . . . . (1. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, Department oj Dejense)
I do not believe it appropriate that the general o£.urs

in question appear before your Subcommittee, butt'that
an~ "desired testimony". . . should be furnished by my
deSIgnated representative. (Emphasis added.) (Melvin
Laird, Secretary oj Dejense)
.

Implicit in these rebuffs to me and the subcommittee
is the assumption of these officers of the executive branch
tha~ they. are entitled to dictate what may appropriately
lO~estl.gated and the scope of any such "appropriate"
lDveStIgatJon.
In action, our system of government is not one of
strictly separated powers, but a government based upon
the conceP.t of ~eparate but balanced powers, divided
along functional lmes. For obvious reasons, such a system
could not and does not operate in strict conformity to
the underlying principle.
The founding fathers fully understood that governmental responsibility must be shared in order to make the
whole fabric of government viable. Yet they knew that
each branch must maintain a basic respect for the duties
and prerogatives of the other branches and that such
divisions are mandatory in order to avoid the undue accre-
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mans are assailing him for having "sold out" Germany
in his negotiations with Moscow and Warsaw. Brandt
J;Ules by virtue of a coalition of his Social Democrats
with the small Free Democratic Party, which fared badly
in a recent by-election. He has a margin of only six in
the Bundestag of 496. In Bonn's upper house, the Bundesrat, his coalition is in the minority. If the Bundesrat
rejects the treaties, Brandt must get an absolute majority
in the Bundestag-249 votes. At present he has only a
paper-thin margin by which to override the upper house
-251 votes--and he has no assurance of holding all
251. He might pick up some defections from the opposition Christian Democratic Union, but that is speculation.
Brandt's best hope lies in popular support in West
Germany. Older Germans remember Hitler, and educated young Germans have some idea of what went on after
the Nazis came to power in 1933. In 1935 the Nobel
Peace Prize went to the Junker pacifist, Carl von Ossitzky, who was to die slowly in a Nazi concentration
camp. Brandt is the first German since Ossietzky to re. ceivc the peace prize-and the first to deserve it. What
course ti1~ West Germans will take is of overriding international importance. If the treaties are turned down, the
well-founded Soviet phobia about Germany will revive in
full force. Men of good will everywhere will rejoice at the
honor bestowed on Willy Brandt, but its political effect
remains to be seen.

The Nominator
In an obscure newspaper item, we noticed that among
those who had nominated Willy Brandt for the Nobel
Peace Prize was Dr. Wolfgang Yourgrau, a professor of
the history of science at Denver University. Pleased to
see that someone in this country had had something to
do with a nomination of which we heartily approved, we
aroused him out of a Sunday nap by telephone, and learned
the following:
Dr. Yourgrau was born in Germany of a Belgian father and a German-Jewish mother. He attended the
University of Berlin, majoring in physics. He wa~ one
of the organizers of a small splinter offshoot of the Socialist Party, opposed to the Communists and the Social
Democrats alike, and of course anti-Fascist. He was recruited by and served with the American OSS during the
war, and subsequently came to the United States. He has
been at Denver for the past eight years.
He remained politically active to the extent of lecturing
from time to time in Sweden and Norway, at the University of Oslo 'a nd elsewhere. He has also lectured in both
East and West Germany. He feels that it is important to
try to explain some aspects of U.S. policy in both camps
and to keep in touch with German opinion, East and
West. In August 1970, and again in November, he wrote
letters to the nominating committee, suggesting Brandt as
a suitable recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.
Yourgrau has never met Brandt and has no ties whatsoever with him. He nominated him because he thought
that what Brandt had done and was doing was of the
greatest importance. Y ourgrau is in the fortunate ( and
rare) position of being able to talk to East and West
without being subservient to either. His basic loyalties are
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firm. Operating from a base in the United States and
with his war record, he is in a position to be impartial
and to speak candidly to both sides. Brandt, it se.emed
to Y ourgrau, was a key figure for somewhat the same
reasons, although, since he occupies a high official position, there are differences in their respective approaches.
Nonetheless, Brandt is the only statesman Yourgrau
knows about wQo can journey to Moscow and to Washington, and in each capital say exactly what he thinks
and what needs urgently to be said.
Yourgrau does not know whether, .on balance,
Brandt's status as a Nobel laureate will harm or help
him in the internal politics of Germany. There were both
long and short-term reasons for nominating him. In practical politics one must take chances. There were five
Brandt nominators besides Yourgrau but the fact that
Yourgrau, an American, is known in Sweden and Norway
may have helped. Regardless of tl1e amount of influence
Yourgrau's initiative may have exerted, it is good to
know that someone in this country saw what needed to
be done, and did it.

Nursing Nixon
The Secret Service, charged with protecting the President, appears to be also engaged in the political role of
selecting his audiences for him. When Mr. Nixon appeared
at Billy Graham Day ceremonies in the Charlotte, N.C.
Coliseum on October 15, local policemen, Secret S~rvice
men and unidentified "marshals" barred from the building
long-haired males and persons in "hippie" attire, even
if those persons had tickets.
The affair had been widely advertised as a "nonpolitical"
event by the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce. Free tickets were available from local banks on a first-come-firstserved basis. Some 13,000 persons filled the Coliseum to
see Nixon and Graham pay tribute to each other. A private reception for Graham, complete with cruciform sandwiches, was attended later by President and Mrs. Nixon.
. Many anti-Nixon protesters-including members of a
local organization, the Charlotte chapter of V~tnam Veterans Against the War, and a number of coHege studuts
-were turned away from the public ceremony. There was
a large, well-mannered contingent from nearby Davidson
College, a small Presbyterian institution. More came from
other local colleges, and a group of about twenty-five
made the 125-mile trip from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
At first ushers told the students they could not enter
with banners, !:ut explained to newsmen that everyone
would be "welcomed without banners." It soon became
evident, however, that the youths weren't going to be admitted under any circumstances-and during the course
of the afternoon more than 100 were denied admission.
Some were tossed out bodily with no explanation; others
were informed that their tickets were "counterfeit," and
many had their tickets ripped up.
•
But the broad broom used by the "marshals" also swep
away many innocent and unsuspecting citizens-including
some Nixon supporters. Three off-duty newsmen from
WBT radio--one of whom. had worked actively in Nixon's
Presidential campaign-said the marshals "literally threw
453

tion of power in anyone branch of the federal government.
As Madison observed in the Federalist No. 48, "After
discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of
power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to
provide some pmctical security for each . ..."
However overlapping the functions of the three branches
may be, and however imprecisely the system may seem
to work, the doctrine of separation of powers itself is
based upon good and sound grounds and the ends it was
designed to serve 200 years ago are at least as important today. Legislative remedies being considered by
the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers would afford

the legislative and executive branches an opportunity to
seek -together some common ground that would more
clearly define the powers, duties and prerogatives of the
two branches in this sensitive area. We must remember
at all times that cooperation between the Congress and
the executive is essential, if the government is to operate
efficiently. That· pressing requirement makes it mandatory
that we seek and find an amicable settlement to the
problems involved in the use of executive privilege to
prevent Congress and the American people from knowing
the details of executive actions. To paraphrase Woodrow
Wilson, warfare between the legislative and the executive branches can be fatal.
0

Pa.kistan: What Never Gets Said
PAUL DEUTSCIDIAN
Mr. Deutschman has been a foreign editor of Life, an official
in the Marshall Plan and in AID, and a foreign correspondent
covering Europe. Asia and A/rica. His first novel is scheduled
for publication by Dial Press next year.

There are very large aspects to the present troubles in
Pakistan and the entire Indian subcontinent about which
nothing is ever said. Both press coverage and public speculations concentrate on what is readily visible-the genocidal war waged by the Pakistani Army against the people
of East Pakistan ; the independence movement there; the
terrible plight of the millions of refugees who in the past
several months have crossed over into India; revelations
about the possible malfeasance, stupidity or just plain
bumbling bureaucracy involved with the delivery of those
shiploads of military hardware; the economic aid cutoffs
recently voted through Congress, etc.
At the risk of seeming to lack compassion, I think the
time is long overdue to mention some of the unmentionables. They may give some clues as to what our government may well be contemplating within the closed
chambers where all those top-secret papers are composed
and contingency tactics mocked up. It may also reveal a
possible way out of the present impasse. And if a way out
is not found, the public must prepare itself for some really
rude future shocks in the next few weeks.
There is, to begin, the background of unspoken emotional and psychological realities. For example:
(1) The subcontinent is beset by harsh tribal differences
and enmities. At the time of partition, the two chief "warrior tribes" of the area, Punjabis and Sikhs (joint mainstays of the old British Indian Army), arrayed themselves
on opposite sides and formed ·the mainstays of the Paldstani and Indian Armies.
Further, the Moslems of West Pakistan (fantasizing
themselves as descendants of the Mogul conquerors) feel
disdain for all the Hindus-those within their own borders
(both "wings" ) , certainly, and also those in India. They
make an exception, perhaps, for the Sikhs, whom they
simply hate-a sentiment that is staunchly reciprocated.
Further still, far down the line in subcontinental "tribal"
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esteem-on both sides of the borders-are the supposedly
meek and energyless Bengalis. Both nations tend to disregard and look down upon their respective Bengalis,
whether of Moslem or Hindu religion.
(2) The religious differences are well known, but the
outside world is insufficiently aware of the crucial fact
that these differences are reflected in rival philosophies of
statehood. In principle, Pakistan is a theocratic state and
India a secular one. In India, the Moslems are a strong and
integrated minority, part of the socio-political mainstream;
in Pakistan, it is not unfair to say that Hindus are a merel
"tolerated" minority-as peripheral to the mainstream
there as, perhaps, 1ews are in Morocco or Protestants in
Italy.
This difference causes certain unmentioned problems:
India can barely tolerate the idea of Pakistan, based, as it
is, on religion, and thus the antithesis of its own premise
for sovereign existence. Pakistan, meanwhile, cannot accept for very long the idea that some of the subcontinent's
60 million Moslems are not included within its bordersthus contradicting its premise for sovereign existence.
(3) We all "know" about the "fatalism" toward life in
Asia. About the "grinding poverty" ; about how the "people-hunger balance" teeters most dangerously there-the
increasing production of grain and other basic foodstuffs,
despite all efforts, being continuously outstripped by the
increasing production of people. But unless you have personally immersed yourself in certain parts of Asia-have,
for example, strolled along the back streets of Calcutta
at sundown in ~'Jmmertime, or through downtown Dacca
during 'the rainy season-you cannot understand how little
difference there can be, truly, between life and death for
so many Asians. Ana it is completely ironic, therefore,
that the geographical cockpit of this present dispute encompasses both Calcutta and Dacca, undoubtedly the two
most luxuriant cesspools of human misery on this planet.
Also, compassion aside, the East Pakistan refugees
should be viewed in terms of living conditions they left
behind them as well as those in which they. now find them (
selves. We've seen photos of hungry, brutalized refugees
living in cramped sections of sewer pipe in bare Indian
fields. But we might also wish to see how the people down
457
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